Reducing Unions\u27 Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits by Lande, Robert H. & Zerbe, Richard O., Jr.
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
5-1985
Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs and
Benefits
Robert H. Lande
University of Baltimore School of Law, rlande@ubalt.edu
Richard O. Zerbe Jr.
Evans School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Washington, zerbe@uw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reducing Unions' Monopoly Power: Costs and Benefits, 28 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1985)
REDUCING UNIONS' MONOPOLY POWER: 
COSTS AND BENEFITS* 
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Washington, D.C. 
I. 
and RICHARD O. ZERBE, JR. 
INTRODUCTION 
University of Washington 
Seattle, Washington 
No one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be con-
cerned with the labor market per se. [ARCHIBALD COX]I 
T HERE is a fundamental conflict between labor law and antitrust law. 
The antitrust laws reflect the powerful idea that competition should usu-
ally dictate the way our economy is organized, to the benefit of the econ-
omy as a whole, including workers. But the labor exemption to the anti-
trust laws suggests a different policy: workers should have the right to 
eliminate competition for wages, hours, and working conditions. 
We plan to examine a key feature of the labor exemption to the antitrust 
laws: the longstanding policy of allowing the workers of several firms, and 
even of an entire industry, to bargain as a unit and the corresponding pol-
icy of allowing all affected employers to bargain together in opposition. 
We compare this system to an alternative proposal-allowing the work-
ers of each company to form a union but examining the mergers of those 
unions by the standards of merger guidelines. Throughout this paper we as-
sume that if two unions cannot merge they also cannot conspire to fix wages, 
strike, and so forth, in accordance with "normal" antitrust principles. 
We begin by attempting to determine the primary goals of the industry-
wide features of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. Using Con-
* This is an abridged version of a draft presented at the Hoover Institution Conference on 
Law and Economic Efficiency. Our larger piece is still in progress. We are grateful to 
Mosche Adler, Nolan Clark, Deborah Crandall, Alan Fisher, Willis Goldsmith, James Hur-
witz, Andrew Kramer, Howard Marvel, Patrick O'Brien, Cornelius Peck, Ross Petty, Rob-
ert Plotnick, Kim T. K. Seah, Joe Sims, and Tom Walton for providing us with extremely 
helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All remaining mistakes are 
our own. 
I Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 252, 254 (1955). 
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXVIII (May 1985)] 
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gress's goals in this area, we compare qualitatively the costs and benefits 
of these alternatives. We ask whether preventing collective bargaining 
units from possessing large market shares might reduce the monopoly 
aspects and rent-seeking behavior of unions and employers, without 
significantly sacrificing unions' abilities to protect workers' rents and en-
hance efficiency.2 Our goal is to frame the analysis in terms of a cost-
benefit trade-off. We provide a framework for debating whether this pro-
posal might be in the best interest of both workers and society as a whole. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Although hundreds of pages of labor statutes bear on the labor exemp-
tion to the antitrust laws,3 the core of this exemption arises from three 
statutes: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act. 4 Congress's primary reason for passing the labor exemption seems to 
have been to allow workers to form effective unions that could protect 
them from the results of their inability to negotiate as equals with corpora-
tions.s This statutory relief sought primarily to protect workers from hav-
2 There have been other proposals for limiting unions in various ways. See, for example, 
Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 659, 709-14 (1965) (reprinted from 6 J. Law & Econ. 152 (1963»; Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards 
to Union Activities, 73 Yale L. J. 14 (1963); H. Gregg Lewis, The Labor-Monopoly Prob-
lems: A Positive Program, 59 J. Pol. Econ. 277 (1951). However, many recent examinations 
of the area conclude that the labor exemption is generally justified. See, for example, 
Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (1984). 
3 Numerous articles and decisions have analyzed the history of the conflict between labor 
and antitrust. We need not repeat it here. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, lBEW, 325 U.S. 
797 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1944); United States v. Hutchenson, 
312 U.S. 219 (1941). These cases firmly established that collective bargaining enjoys a 
general exemption from the antitrust laws. See also Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & 
Steamfitters, Local 100,421 U.S. 616 (1975). Some of the best articles in this area include 
Symposium: The Application of Antitrust Laws to Labor-related Activities, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 
331-448 (1983); Douglas L. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1183 
(1980); Meltzer, supra note 2. 
4 Current version ofthe Sherman Act codified at 15 U .S.C. § I (1976). For the legislative 
history of the Sherman Act's concern with labor, see Allen G. Siegel, Walter B. Connolly, 
Jr., & Richard K. Walker, The Antitrust Exemption for Labor-Magna Carta or Carte 
Blanche? 13 Duq. L. Rev. 411, 415-20 (1975) and the sources cited therein. Current version 
of the Clayton Act codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 17,52 (1976). Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-15 (1976). As the Supreme Court has observed, these laws are "interlacing statutes" 
that must be read together to understand the labor exemption properly. See Allen Bradley 
Co. v. Local 3, lBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945). 
5 This short analysis of the legislative history of the exemption is based on a reading of 
relevant Committee Reports, the material that the Supreme Court cited in important labor 
exemption cases, and selected portions of the congressional debates. It is not meant to be a 
complete examination of the topic. Only illustrative citations are provided. For examples of 
Congress's quest for equality, in the Sherman Act debates Senator Stewart advocated 
"combination among the laborers to protect themselves from grasping monopolies .... " 21 
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ing to accept less than they were "entitled" to receive as a "fair" return 
for their labor-in other words, Congress implicitly assigned property 
rights to certain rents to workers. Efficiency also appears to have been a 
concern. Congress wanted to prevent labor-management violence and 
thereby to ensure the peaceful resolution of labor disputes through collec-
tive bargaining; this has clear efficiency implications. Members of Con-
gress gave other reasons as well, but Congress's central concern was to 
equalize workers' bargaining position so that they could earn a "fair" 
wage, as many leading Supreme Court labor exemption opinions have 
recognized. 6 
This countervailing power notion also seems to have been the rationale 
behind permitting multiemployer and industry-wide bargaining.7 Formal 
collective bargaining involving more than one employer and more than 
one local union must be agreed to by every participating union and em-
ployer before it will be certified by the NLRB. Unions often coordinate 
their behavior informally, however. 
Congo Rec. 2606 (1890). The Clayton Act debates quote an article from Organized Labor, 
May 23, 1914, entitled "Labor's Position on the Antitrust Law": "[Labor Unions] are 
formed to prevent the lowering of wages even more than to further the raising of wages ... . 
Their end is not a monopoly of work, but proper pay for the work the workers perform ... . 
[Unions desire] only to see that the laborer gets his proper hire .... [Employers seek] to 
gouge labor of its share of what it produces." 51 Congo Rec. 9551-52 (1914). Senator 
Ashurst noted: "The individual employee is frequently unable to insist upon the 'square 
deal'; ... unless he acts in concert with his brother employees." Jd. at 13,667. See also 51 
Congo Rec. 9086 (workers should be able to "band together for the protection of their rights 
and interests") (remarks of Rep. Kelly). See also 51 Congo Rec. 13,662 (remarks of Senator 
Ashurst). The Senate Report on what later became the Norris-LaGuardia Act stated: "A 
single laborer, standing alone, confronted with such far-reaching, overwhelming concentra-
tion of employer power, and compelled to labor for the support of himself and family, is 
absolutely helpless to negotiate or to exert any influence over the fixing of his wages or the 
hours and conditions of his labor." S. Rep. 163. 72d Cong .• 1st Sess, to accompany S.935 at 
9. There was also a realization that strikes were harmful to the economy as a whole. See 51 
Congo Rec. 9658 (remarks of Rep. Volstead). We nevertheless found only scattered direct 
references to the efficiency concept. See, for example. 51 Congo Rec. 13.668. Other congres-
sional goals included protecting workers' freedom of contract, protecting workers from 
arbitrary employer activity. and preserving social stability. See 51 Congo Rec. 13.662 (re-
marks of Senator Ashurst). S. Rep. 163. 72d Cong .• 1st Sess .• to accompany S. 935. men-
tioned as goals securing "that freedom of association. self-organization. and mutual help and 
protection which all of us want to make secure" (page 8) and "the redress of grievances 
[and] peace rather than strife" (page 1 0). 
6 For example. the Court noted in United States v. Hutchenson, 312 U.S. at 229. quoting 
with approval Duplex Co. v. Deering. 254 U.S. 443, 484 (1921), that the exemption "was 
designed to equalize before the law the position of working men and employer as industrial 
combatants. " 
7 No law directly permits multiemployer bargaining. Its origins are obscure, and it ap-
pears to be judicially created. See The Developing Labor Law (Charles J. Morris ed .• 2d ed. 
1983); Leonard L. Scheinholtz & Kenneth Kettering, Exemption under the Antitrust Laws 
for Joint Employer Activity, 21 Duq. L. Rev. 346. 355-57 (1983). As those sources note, the 
Supreme Court has approved the existence of multiemployer bargaining units on several 
occasions. 
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Given the background, it is not surprising that Congress and the Su-
preme Court did not consider the possibility that there might be ways to 
secure equality for workers with fewer inefficient side effects.s One 
comes away with the impression that Congress saw the choice as either 
offering unions virtually complete exemption from the antitrust laws or 
not achieving anything close to equality of bargaining power.9 The elimi-
nation or reduction of union monopoly power is not, however, inconsis-
tent with the legislative language or with the congressional record. Exist-
ing law arose from the courts' inability to achieve the congressional goal 
of equality while limiting union monopoly power. The notion of preserv-
ing equality of bargaining through imposing market share restraints on 
unions and multiemployer bargaining units is perhaps a more finely tuned 
approach than could have been expected at the time. 
III. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE INDUSTRY-WIDE EXEMPTION 
A. Protection of Workers' Rents and Enhancement of 
Economic Efficiency 
A policy consistent with the maximization of social welfare would pos-
sibly encourage, and at least not be inimical to, the formation of unions in 
some form. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian cogently suggest how the exis-
tence of unions may promote efficiency. \0 Unions may be a mechanism to 
reduce contract costs where the firm or employees invest in specific hu-
man capital. In the absence of unions, both employer and employee have 
an incentive to extract rents opportunistically. The union may be able to 
enhance the credibility of workers and ensure the performance of long-
term contracts by preventing individual workers from acting opportunis-
tically. At the same time, the union provides a credible threat (strike) 
against companies that attempt opportunistic behavior. Thus, the exis-
tence of unions can ensure that workers obtain a larger portion of these 
rents and also encourag~ efficiency. Some of these efficiencies might 
depend on the size of the bargaining unit. We have, however, discovered 
8 Complex NLRB procedures govern the formation and dissolution of multiemployer 
bargaining units. See Morris, supra note 7, at 476-80. A crucial question posed by this paper 
is whether the NLRB could refuse to certify multiemployer bargaining units with larger than 
specified market shares. 
9 The labor exemption was much more limited until the depression. Even if, as an anti de-
pression measure, Congress wished through the Wagner Act to give monopoly power to 
unions, we question whether this is an appealing rationale for allowing union monopoly 
power today. 
10 Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, & Armen AIchian, Vertical Integration, Appropri-
able Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & Econ. 297 (1978). 
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no important examples of efficiencies that require unions larger than the 
plant or firm, other than economies of organization and bargaining. 
There is also a public goods argument for the existence of unions. Many 
features of the workplace, such as safety conditions, pollution levels, 
comfort, the speed of the production line, and the grievance procedure, 
have a public goods quality. Many people get the gains, or no one does. 
Any individual worker has an insufficient incentive to provide information 
on these matters to management, because benefits accrue to workers 
collectively. Unions can provide a "voice" and be efficient suppliers of 
information to management. II Finally, unions may arise and persist as a 
means of monitoring the effectiveness of management. 12 That is, badly 
managed firms attract unions and realize gains from implementing more 
effective use of the labor force. Workers may be better able than stock-
holders to monitor certain management inefficiencies. I3 
The view of unions as efficient providers of services has support in the 
empirical literature. In manufacturing and construction (and, at one time, 
underground bituminous coal mining), unionized firms appear to have 
greater productivity than nonunion firms, other things being equal. 14 Part 
of the union/nonunion differential in productivity can be explained be-
cause the quit rate is much lower for unionized companies, 15 a fact consis-
11 See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 2, at 8-10. 
12 Clark, in his study of the cement industry, found that entrance of unions was typically 
followed by a change in lower or middle management. Clark also found the quality of 
management to be higher in unionized firms. Kim B. Clark, The Impact of Unionization on 
Productivity: A Case Study, 33 Indus. Lab. Relations Rev. 451 (1980); Kim Clark, Unioniza-
tion and Productivity: Micro Econometric Evidence, 95 Q. J. Econ. 613 (1980). An alterna-
tive hypothesis would be that firms with better management tend to become unionized. If 
management is collecting short-term rents, the formation of a union may preserve these 
rents for workers. This would not, however, explain a persistent association of unions with 
better management. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 
57 Pub. Interest 69 (1979). 
13 Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Collective Bargaining; Can the 
New Facts Be Explained by Monopoly Unionism, in New Approaches to Labor Unions 
(Special Volume, Res. Labor Econ.) (Suppl. 2, Joseph Reid ed. 1983) at 293, conclude that 
unions increase inequality among blue-collar workers due to the higher wages of blue-collar 
union workers but reduce inequality among union workers and reduce the blue-collar/white-
collar differential. They argue that these latter equality effects are greater than the inequality 
effect. However, one reason we do not find this argument convincing is that, in spite of their 
claims, Freeman and Medoff are unable to compare the difference in inequality between the 
situation in which unions exist and one in which unions do not exist. [d. at 304. In a careful 
analysis of existing studies Lewis finds that unions are probably neutral with respect to 
income inequality. See H. Gregg Lewis, Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey (forthcom-
ing). 
14 See Freeman & Medoff, supra note 13, and references cited therein. The higher pro-
ductivity remains after the effect of capital-labor ratios and higher-quality labor for 
unionized firms are taken into account. 
15 [d. at 302. 
302 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
tent with the notion that unions may supply credibility to ensure long-
term contract fulfillment. 16 The reduction in quit rates associated with 
unionization cannot be attributed to monopoly wages, to reduction in 
employer-initiated separations, or to unionization of more stable workers. 
Rather, the critical factor seems to be changes in worker attitudes and 
behavior that arise from the union setting. 17 
Much of the theory and evidence demonstrating the efficiencies that 
can arise from unions is new and controversial. Doubtless it wiII be 
criticized. Even assuming that all of these efficiencies from unionization 
do commonly arise and that unionization also serves to protect workers' 
rents, however, the critical question for this paper is whether industry-
wide collective bargaining is required to produce these benefits. We have 
found no evidence that the existence of monopoly power by unions vis-a-
vis employers is necessary for, or even related to, those aspects of unions 
that promote efficiency or protect workers' rents. 
B. Rent-seeking Behavior and Economic Inefficiency 
1. Monopoly Aspects of the Exemption. There is surprisingly little 
reliable information on the type, extent, or magnitude of those effects of 
unions associated solely with their monopoly power. Reasonable data on 
the market share of unions do not exist. On the order of 200 studies of the 
relative effects of unions have appeared since Lewis's classic 1963 
study. 18 Current work by Lewis finds that these studies show an average 
union/nonunion wage differential of about 15 percent. 19 In addition, there 
are almost no data that might be used to measure the monopoly power of 
unions, or even concentration ratios, and no estimates of that part of the 
wage gap or gain due to monopoly power. 20 Thus we know neither the 
16 Freeman and Medoff point out that the firm responds primarily to the needs of the 
marginal worker, who is young and marketable. In a unionized setting, by contrast, the 
union takes account of all workers, and senior workers may be more powerful within 
the union in determining its demands at the bargaining table, so that the desires of workers 
who are less able to leave the enterprise are also represented. Freeman & Medoff, supra 
note 2, at 9-10. Since unions ensure greater weight for the preferences of senior workers 
they might encourage younger workers to invest in job-specific training and to stay. 
17 [d. 
18 H. Gregg Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the U.S. (1963). 
19 See Lewis, supra note 13, at ch. 9. This work is unpublished, and his estimates must be 
regarded as preliminary. Lewis believes this estimate has an upward bias. These studies 
provide an estimate of the wage gain from unionization relative to nonunionization only if 
the supply curve of nonunion labor is completely elastic and is unaffected by unionization. 
20 As far as we can determine no concentration ratios or Herfindahl index have been 
calculated for unions. We have calculated a Herfindahl index for unions at the industry two-
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wage effects of unions compared to not having a union nor the wage 
effects of union monopoly power. 
Consequently, there is considerable controversy about how much of 
the union/nonunion wage differential is attributable to the efficiency ef-
fects of unions and how much to the monopoly effects. Some argue that 
the efficiency effects completely offset or even override the effect of 
monopoly. 
The best evidence is that they do not. 21 A study of253 NLRB represen-
tation elections from 1962 to 1980 found that stock prices fell both when a 
petition for a union election was filed with the NLRB and when a union 
was certified as bargaining agent. Moreover, the fall in stock prices was 
larger in response to a petition before the election in cases in which the 
union ultimately won the e1ection.22 Second; and consistent with the pre-
vious point, management usually resists the formation of a union. Third, 
the rate of profit per unit of capital appears to be lower under unionism. 23 
Finally, evidence of the influence of monopoly power on union wages is 
found in the pattern of the union/nonunion wage differential as it varies 
with the unions' jurisdiction. The wage gap depends crucially on the 
ability of a union to extend its coverage to all firms in a particular mar-
ket. 24 A characteristic of some unions that are relatively successful, such 
as miners, longshoremen, and construction workers, is that there are 
distinct geographic limits to the relevant product markets. 
Because the estimates of the monopoly effect of unions are crude, there 
digit level. The index was constructed using union data from the u.s. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations, Bulletin 2079 (1980) 
and employment data from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (1980). The Directory of 
National Unions, Appendix I, 105-07, gives the percentage of membership employed in 
each industry group for the major unions in each group. From these figures the number of 
employees represented by each union in each industry was calculated by taking the appro-
priate percentage of the membership figures given in the directory. The figure for the market 
share of each union was then calculated as the ratio of number of union employees in the 
industry to total number of employees in the industry. All data are for 1978. Even for such 
gross market definitions the index is above the 1800 level and is often higher than corporate 
four-digit industry concentration levels within the same two-digit classification. 
21 See Kim B. Clark, Unionization and Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits, 
Growth, and Productivity, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 893 (1984). 
22 Richard S. Ruboch & Martin B. Zimmerman, Unionization and Profitability: Evidence 
from the Capital Market (unpublished manuscript) (Sloan School Mgmt., MIT, October 
1982). 
23 Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, Trade Unionism in the Production Process, 86 J. 
Pol. Econ. 355 (1978); Kim Clark, The Impact of Unionization on Firm Performance: 
Profits, Growth and Productivity (working paper, Harv. Bus. Sch. HBS 83-9900 1983); John 
Frantz, The Impact of Trade Unions on Productivity in the Wood Household Furniture 
Industry (1970) (unpublished senior honors thesis. Harv. Univ.). 
24 See Harold M. Levinson. Determining Forces in Collective Bargaining (1966). 
304 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
are no good estimates of the deadweight loss. A recent estimate puts the 
loss at approximately $5-$10 billion per year. 25 These calculations also 
imply a transfer of wealth from shareholders and consumers to union 
members of about ten times this amount. 26 
In addition, unions can be expected to take part oftheir rent in working 
conditions or featherbedding instead of wages. 27 For both these reasons, 
the choice of inputs and working conditions will be affected by the exis-
tence of unions with monopoly power, and restrictive work practices and 
featherbedding are associated with unions. 28 And, although there are no 
reliable recent estimates, such restrictive practices impose a social cost. 
Albert Rees some twenty years ago concluded that this cost is probably 
larger than the welfare losses associated with the relative wage effect. 29 
Multiemployer bargaining is consistent with the desire to equalize bar-
gaining power, and it can offset union power. Multiemployer bargaining 
may not involve monopoly power and may materially reduce negotiating 
costs. To this extent such bargaining units are desirable. To the extent 
multiemployer bargaining involves monopoly power on either side, how-
ever, it is not in the interests of consumers. Further, employers often are 
much less concerned with their absolute costs than with their costs rela-
tive to their competitors, and since multiemployer bargaining reduces the 
elasticity of labor demand as compared with single-firm bargaining, it is 
possible that multiemployer bargaining could lead to increased wages. 30 
25 Freeman & Medoff, supra note 2, at 57. This estimate of the deadweight loss from the 
union wage effect by Freeman and Medoff might be too high, perhaps by two-thirds. Their 
estimate is based on partial equilibrium assumptions that are clearly inappropriate. Neither 
income nor cross effects are taken into account. Lee Edelfson, The Deadweight Loss 
Triangle as a Measure of General Equilibrium Welfare Loss: Harberger Reconsidered 
(working paper, Univ. Washington, Dep't Econ. 1984) provides a method of doing this and 
finds general equilibrium calculations of the deadweight loss triangle for typical simulation of 
parameters usually to be a fraction of the loss calculated by partial equilibrium analysis. The 
threat of unionization, however, leads to higher wages for nonunionized workers, tending to 
make this estimate too low. 
26 Calculated from Freeman & Medoff, supra note 2, at 267. 
27 Existing labor law does not enable unions to maximize rents. To maximize its total 
rents or its wage rate, ignoring costs of extraction (transaction costs), a union would need to 
control the price and quantities of other inputs and the price, quantities, qualities, and 
characteristics of output. However, such control is often illegal. Without it, as unions raise 
their wages, employers adjust their employment of all inputs and output margins, thereby in 
part frustrating union attempts to maximize the benefits that they achieve for their members. 
This result can be inferred from Yoram BarzeI & Keith Leffler, Tie-in Sales and Multi-Good 
Pricing (working paper, Univ. Wash., Dep't. Econ. 1980); Frederick Warren Boulton, Verti-
cal Control and Markets (1978). 
28 For an economic analysis see Paul Weinstein, The Featherbedding Problem, 54 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 145 (1964). 
29 Albert Rees, The Effect of Union on Resource Allocations, 6 J. Law & Econ. 69 (1963). 
30 Thus, mUltiemployer bargaining is more likely where labor constitutes a relatively large 
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As the next section illustrates, multiemployer bargaining units also in-
crease the potential for rent seeking by unions and employers. 
2. Rent Seeking by Unions and Employers. An emerging literature 
forcefully argues that the problem of rent seeking by raising competitors' 
costs is an important, widespread, and costly phenomenon. 31 One ex-
ample of this behavior comes from unions' and/or employers' using the 
unions' monopoly power to raise the costs of rival employers. Differences 
in capitallIabor ratios, safety conditions, environmental conditions, 
methods of doing business, costs to enter a market or to introduce innova-
tive business techniques all present potential opportunities for union con-
tracts that affect firms in different ways. Cases of probable rent seeking 
by employers attempting to use unions' power form much of the back-
bone of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws. 32 
In the past decade dozens of cases have been decided in which rent 
seeking to raise costs to competitors using union monopoly power proba-
bly was involved. These and earlier cases involve possible attempts by a 
union to raise costs to nonunion firms and attempts by employers to raise 
costs to innovative rivals and to new entrants. This rent seeking is costly 
proportion of total costs, a fact consistent with the use of multiemployer bargaining to 
escape a competitive disadvantage. D. R. Deaton & P. B. Beaumont, The Determinates of 
Bargaining Structure: Some Large Scale Evidence for Britain, 18 Brit. J. Ind. Relations 101 
(1980); Wallace E. Hendricks & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Determinates of Bargaining Struc-
ture in U.S. Manufacturers Industries, 35 Ind. & Lab. Relations Rev. 181-95 (1982). Empir-
ical evidence indicates multiemployer bargaining units raise wages for units operating in the 
local, as opposed to the national, labor markets. See Wallace E. Hendricks & Lawrence M. 
Kahn, The Demand for Labor Market Structure: An Economic Approach, 2 J. Lab. Econ. 
412 (1984); Peter Feulle, Wallace E. Hendricks, & Lawrence M. Kahn, Wage and Non-
Wage Outcomes in Collective Bargaining: Determinates and Tradeoffs, 2 Lab. Research 39 
1981); Wallace E. Hendricks, Labor Market Structure and Union Wage Levels, 13 Econ. 
Inquiry 401 (1975). 
31 That cost-increasing rent seeking may be common should come as no surprise. The 
gains from raising a rival's costs are immediate; there is no sacrifice of short-run profits for 
longer-term gains. The rival's response to increased costs is to decrease output, allowing 
some combination of a higher price and an increased market share for the firm initiating the 
cost increase. Finally, cost-increasing strategies do not require a deep pocket or superior 
access to financial resources. Salop and Scheffman show that a sufficient condition for a 
cost-increasing strategy to be profitable is that the market price must increase by more than 
the increase in the average costs of the dominant firm. This increases the dominant firm's 
profits even if the firm does not adjust outputs in response to the increased costs. Steven 
Salop & David Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267 (1983). For early 
examples of rent seeking in this context, see Howard Marvel, Factory Regulation: A Reex-
amination of Early English Experience, 20 J. Law & Econ. 379 (1977); Oliver Williamson, 
Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 84 Q. J. Econ. 
(1968). The classic article on rent seeking is by George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). 
32 For representative cases, see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Adams Dairy Co. v. St. Louis 
Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.) (1958). 
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both in terms of outcome and in terms of resources consumed in its 
pursuit, although no estimates of these costs can be easily made. 
Collective bargaining inevitably affects employers in different ways. 
One cannot easily determine if these differential effects result from a 
union's seeking its own ends or from the attempts of one set of employers 
to raise the costs of others. In fact, these results in many instances may be 
compatible. Economic analysis therefore cannot cure the ambiguities 
flowing from the legal principles that currently define the boundaries of 
the labor exemption to the antitrust statutes. 33 
Under existing law it is all but impossible to prevent such rent-seeking 
behavior by unions or employers. The courts seem to be unwilling to find 
unlawful conduct unless the unions "conspire" with some nonexempt 
group (such as employers) to restrain competition on subjects outside the 
ordinary purview of bargaining (that is, different from wages, hours, or 
working conditions).34 Courts also place varying reliance on whether the 
restraint is a labor market or product market restraint and whether the 
nonexempt group had the agreement thrust upon it or actively sought it. 
These distinctions are without substantial economic foundation. A suc-
cessful economic conspiracy requires an agreement and the ability to 
police it. The collective bargaining process and the collective bargaining 
agreement can provide both of these. The current legal doctrines catch 
only the unwise and unwary. 
Economic theory provides no justification for the Byzantine distinc-
tions that arise naturally from the existing system of applying the antitrust 
law to multiemployer bargaining. In the next section we propose one way 
out: change the overall framework of the labor exemption. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SUBJECTING UNIONS TO THE ANTIMERGER LAWS: 
GUIDELINES FOR UNION MERGERS 
We propose that the law treat unions and corporations equally: mergers 
and joint operations are permissible, except those for which the anticom-
petitive potential is likely to outweigh the procompetitive benefits.35 One 
33 The current law focuses on the wrong issue-"agreement"-when it should be con-
cerned with competitive effect. If unions have no monopoly power, the presumption should 
be that their success in setting wages reflects efficiency considerations. An extension of the 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian argument spells out the efficient possibility. For example, a 
firm with wage flexibility may unilaterally lower wages for workers who have made firm-
specific capital investments. See Benjamin Klein, Contract Costs and Administered Prices: 
An Economic Theory of Rigid Wages, 74 Am. Econ. Rev., Papers & Proc. 332 (1984). 
34 Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) muddied an 
already confusing area of the law. For a discussion of this case and the legal standards in this 
area see the articles cited in note 3 supra. 
3S The normal antitrust rules against conspiracies in restraint of trade between corpora-
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should analyze contemplated union mergers and joint bargaining, like 
similar corporate activities, by balancing the inefficiencies likely to arise 
against any efficiencies and other congressionally sought benefits so aris-
ing. 36 And, just as antitrust law makes the presumption that implicit or 
explicit coordination between firms is more likely as industry concentra-
tion rises, a more concentrated labor market (that is, a market consisting 
of unions within the same industry) would be assumed more easily able to 
coordinate its actions. 37 
Assuming that unions provide both efficiencies and market power ef-
fects, the law should develop a set of merger guidelines for unions. 38 
Under the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, most horizontal cor-
porate mergers are allowed unless they increase concentration signifi-
cantly-the Guidelines suggest an increase of 50-100 points in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a benchmark. Because Congress's prime 
objective in this area is achieving bargaining equality between labor and 
capital, the most appropriate way to resolve the trade-off is to use the 
corporate standards for union mergers as well. 39 
We have thus far uncovered no significant appropriable worker rents 
that could not be protected, or union efficiencies that could not be 
tions would also apply to conspiracies between unions. Similarly, just as two or more 
corporations often can undertake joint ventures without violating the antitrust laws, we 
would often permit unions to form joint ventures, particularly those directed toward re-
search. For example, we would generally permit some or all of the unions in an industry to 
form a joint venture to research ways to improve worker safety. We would not, of course, 
permit unions to enter a "joint venture" to achieve identical wages. 
36 For a corporate merger trade-off analysis see Oliver Williamson, Economies as an 
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968). For a recent 
discussion of the topic see Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in 
Merger Enforcement, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1580 (1983). 
37 We do not explore here the practical task of defining markets for the purpose of 
establishing union merger and bargaining guidelines. We note that in the case of craft unions 
the relevant market may be geographic and cut across several industries. In the case of 
industrial unions the relevant market may be coincidental with the industry. 
38 The raison d'etre of guidelines is to give businessmen predictability and certainty, and 
to protect them from arbitrary or politically motivated governmental action. See Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal 
Stud. 399, 423-26 (1973). It might, of course, be difficult to keep political considerations 
from entering the type of analysis discussed in this paper. 
39 Such guidelines should probably make a de minimus exception for industries with 
fewer than a specified number of workers. For such industries, we might presume (without 
evidence) that inefficiencies caused by industry-wide unions were unlikely to be substantial, 
while industry-wide economies of scale might be significant and suggest that the entire 
industry's workers be allowed to unionize. Further, the union merger guidelines would have 
to define its terms very carefully. When calculating union market shares, for example, it 
would have to decide whether to count all of the workers at an open shop operation receiv-
ing benefits from the existence of the union, or only the union's members. Finally, there may 
be labor markets, such as certain building trade markets, for which special solutions might 
have to be devised. 
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achieved, despite some limitations on the market shares of unions. Any 
absolute size thresholds for effective union management, general experi-
ence and n~gotiating expertise, organization, and financial strength are 
presumably obtainable through vertical or conglomerate union mergers or 
through small horizontal union mergers,40 which generally would be legal 
under our proposal. 
The costs of our proposal are several. First, there is trade-off between 
union size and multi employer bargaining on the one hand and negotiating 
costs on the other. Since our proposal would reduce the size of some 
bargaining units, it may well cause small increases in negotiating costs in 
these cases. Among the costs of our proposal we consider that during a 
transition period we might expect collusive activity, given unions' estab-
lished patterns of behavior. Broken up by a law unions would undeniably 
consider unfair, conspiracy among unions might be a natural tendency, at 
least initially. Our proposal could also have a negative effect on worker 
morale and productivity and could lead to violence by disgruntled union 
members, at least in the short term. 
Moreover, unions could still observe each others' behavior and act 
interdependently. So would employers. One employer would be reluctant 
to give in to wage demands unless it knew that its rivals would also. 
Employers and unions would both have an incentive to behave like 
oligopolists. 
The benefits of our proposal include the reduction of deadweight loss 
and rent-seeking costs. Our proposal would generate other benefits by 
stimulating competition among unions. Competition within an industry 
among unions and among union leaders is desirable, just as is competition 
among corporations and among corporate executives within an industry. 
Unions (and union leaders) would compete for members. Competition 
among unions would also determine which union could convince workers 
that it could secure the best benefits and working conditions for its mem-
bers, perhaps weeding out inefficient unions or union leaders. This com-
petition could also weed out corrupt union leaders who pay themselves 
too much, take bribes, or sell out to management. 
An additional benefit would be the growth and formation of unions. 
Employers often resist the unionization of their employees. If the 
efficiency effects of unions are significant, both employers and employees 
40 For example, unions in different industries would usually be permitted to pool their 
financial resources to enable individual unions to sustain and publicize strikes. Vertical and 
conglomerate mergers are virtually certain to arise and help unions achieve scale economies. 
Such mergers are a large part of our answer to those who believe that our proposal might 
destroy unions' strength. 
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should desire them, even in the absence of their monopoly power. If the 
efficiency effects of unions are as common as some claim, our proposal 
might lead to the growth of unions in those areas in which the efficiencies 
could be realized. 
One practical problem could arise from this paper's approach: it would 
require evaluating mergers between corporations in terms of both corpo-
rate and union market shares (and other factors). Suppose, for example, 
that two firms wanted to merge, and that each had 5 percent of an uncon-
centrated market. Courts and economists alike would normally allow 
such a merger. But suppose that their employees belonged to different 
industrial unions, that the relevant labor market is coextensive with the 
relevant product and geographic market, and that each of the unions had 
20 percent of the workers in that market. We could avoid letting the 
unions merge to control 40 percent of the industry by several different 
methods. 
First, we could require the workers of the combined company to join 
whichever of the two unions had the smaller market share. 41 Although this 
solution could still cause the union merger guidelines to be violated some-
what, such violations might not be too substantial, and this solution might 
be optimal.42 Second, we could require the unions to split or reform on 
their own in any way that ensured that the unions did not exceed the 
Union Merger Guidelines. This could be disruptive, requiring many work-
ers to change unions. But it would have the advantages of flexibility and 
maximum control for workers over the format of their unions. A third 
possibility would be to allow only those corporate mergers that would not 
result in violations of the union merger guidelines. This solution could, 
however, have the unfortunate effect of depriving society of the benefits 
of many efficiency-enhancing corporate mergers. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to raise for discussion the desirability of 
changing the existing labor exemption and subjecting unions and multiem-
ployer bargaining units to the antimerger and other antitrust laws. This 
proposal might substantially fulfill the primary goals of society underlying 
the labor exemption but in a more efficient way than the prevailing sys-
tem. It would treat worker and business combinations equally, in a way 
that might make society, including workers, better off. It also might pre-
41 Of course, these workers should also have the option of forming their own separate 
union. 
42 However, the smaller union may be smaller because it is less efficient. 
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serve the rent-protection and efficiency-enhancing aspects of unions 
while diminishing their monopoly and rent-seeking aspects. 43 It should 
also continue to prevent employers from opportunistically acquiring 
workers' rents and from combining with unions to engage in rent-seeking 
behavior. Had our proposal for limiting union market shares been on the 
agenda when the basic features of the labor exemptions were being for-
mulated and interpreted, it might have been chosen instead, either by 
Congress or the Supreme Court, as also consistent with Congress's goals. 
More~ver, the fact that our proposal would give a stimulus to the growth 
of unions may, even now, in this period of declining union membership, 
go a long way toward reducing otherwise powerful opposition.44 
Whether such a solution actually would be superior to the present 
system depends on several unanswered, mostly empirical, questions, 
which have been discussed throughout this paper. Our purpose was not to 
answer these questions but to raise them and to suggest that carefully 
specified limitations on union monopoly power might be in the public 
interest. 
43 Meltzer, supra note 2, at 711, warns that a total ban on union mergers could produce 
unduly weak, atomistic unions. Our proposal, by contrast, which would allow many hori· 
zontal, and virtually all vertical and conglomerate union mergers, should not suffer from this 
defect. Given the current wave of union mergers, consideration of our proposal may be 
timely. 
44 In Japan multiemployer bargaining is relatively rare. Our proposal would move the 
U.S. system closer to the Japanese model. See William B. Gould, Labor Law in Japan and 
the United States: A Comparative Perspective, 6 Indus. Relations L. J. I (1984). 
